L'absence d'une analyse quelconque du concept de vérité a de quoi surprendre dans un discours qui se propose de dire à quelles conditions s'obtient cette vérité. C'est pourtant bien de cette carence que souffrent les Méditations. A l'exception d'une brève allusion, dans la Cinquième Méditation, attribuable d'ailleurs à Clerselier, et dans une traduction remaniée par lui mais non approuvée par Descartes, le mot « vérité » n'y est défini nulle part.

Kostos Axelos, Greek-born Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne and author of a trilogy in French, Le Déploiement de l'errance, and of several French translations of Lucás and Heidegger, attempts an important confrontation of the two thinkers whom many regard as the major thinkers in European thought today: Marx and Heidegger. To some this is a confrontation of the left and the right, but Axelos moves in an entirely different range altogether. Heidegger himself remarks that a confrontation with Marx must (...) be made in terms of the problem of history. Both Heidegger and Marx--to some extent as the heirs of Hegel--are philosophers of the future. Axelos' book is written from the Heideggerian standpoint, centering on Heidegger's interpretation of the present age in terms of Technik, which is itself a movement in the mission of Being. The movements of the Geschick, as Heidegger says in Der Satz vom Grund and as Axelos emphasizes, are a world-play. The task of a thinking concerned with the future is to play along with the play. The future in Marxist and Heideggerian terms is a "planetary" age, beyond all nationalism, ruled by a global or planetary technology. Thinking must decide whether and how such technology will be an instrument of liberation or of oppression. Axelos' confrontation raises many central and interesting questions: what is the relationship between Heidegger's Gelassenheit and Marx's praxis? What hope is there for a future governed by a play? etc. The book can be recommended as both original and provocative.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Deely’s book will not be of great interest to anyone who is not overly interested in Scholastic thought. It will specifically appeal to the Thomistic philosophers who sense an affinity between Aquinas’s philosophy of being with its emphasis upon esse and the Heideggerian Seinsdenken. Its main thesis is curious. The Heideggerian Sein is indeed comparable to the Scholastic esse but on grounds hitherto overlooked. Heidegger’s experience of Being is profoundly phenomenological and hence, for Heidegger, Being always means the source of (...) manifestness or unconcealment. For Heidegger, Aquinas’s esse is a matter of simple "reality" or what in Being and Time is called existentia. Hence Deely contends the real affinity between Heidegger and the Scholastic tradition lies in what the Schoolmen called esse intentionale, being inasmuch as it is known or exists in the mind. One offshoot of this thesis is that Heidegger’s phenomenology of Being is closer to the pristine sense of intentionality than is either Brentano’s or Husserl’s. Thus Heidegger’s claim to have carried phenomenology back into its ultimate roots and to offer the more authentic phenomenology is thereby vindicated. The book follows a strange tact which is filled with difficulties, not the least of which is pointed out by Richardson’s observation that it is difficult to see how esse intentionale has anything to do with the historical character of Heidegger’s Sein. In a word: what can esse intentionale possibly have to do with Ereignis?—J. D. C. (shrink)

This is a collection of essays and lectures which have all been published previously. Heidegger prefaces the volume with a series of remarks, written in 1967, which elaborate upon the title Wegmarken. The path in question is what he has called on numerous occasions his Denkweg. The path is the way of thinking into the truly thought-worthy. The path goes back into what was once thought out and is now covered over, and forward into what is to be thought out (...) but is still concealed. The thinker en route to Being has had his thinking set in motion by Being itself. Thinking travels a troubled path, for it stands in constant danger of being flooded by mere information. Whether or not it can bypass this roadblock is still the essential question for our time. Three of the texts collected here were available only in journals and Festschriften. It is also interesting that Heidegger includes all three segments of Was ist Metaphysik? He does not fuse them into a single text but arranges them separately. The other selections are: Vom Wesen des Grundes; Vom Wesen der Wahrheit; Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit; Brief über den "Humanismus"; Zur Seinsfrage; Kants These über das Sein. Here we see what Heidegger himself has singled out as being representative of, and significant for, the course of his thought. The emphasis upon "path" argues strongly for those who would see in Heidegger's thought an evolving, developing growth. The unity of early and later Heidegger then is not the unity of a single doctrine but the unity of a single search or path, unified by a single object of pursuit.--J. D. C. (shrink)

In Not God Enough, J.D. Greear explains that the thing between you and the vibrant faith you want isn't answers to all our spiritual questions, but an escape from the small God we've imagined in place of an actual encounter with the real, awesome, glorious God of the Bible.

Democracy may well be the primary virtue of political systems. Yet European politics is marked by a democracy deficit that will not disappear spontaneously. While legal and political theory on this issue is dominated by supporters of civic institutionalism and constitutional republicanism, liberal nationalists seem to be split. They justify the civic nationhood of member states, but they shrink away from the idea of a European people. This essay claims that a quasi-national conception of European identity can be conducive to (...) the rise of a democratic political union of Europe. It discusses the mechanisms and rules for Europeanization of the sense of equal dignity and solidarity. This approach to supranational identity is explicitly instrumental and orientated towards the long run. However, the main liberal objections against it can be countered. (shrink)

nature of personality and the structure of personality are distinguished, and the thesis that mainstream personality theories in psychology debate structure but not nature is illustrated with definitions. Mainstream theories assume that person ality is an inner determinant of behavior, but according to views in psychiatry, phenomenology and radical behaviorism the nature of personality is transactional. The theory of reinforcement schedules proposes general mechanisms of transac tions, and phenomenology gives particular transactions meaning. Interactionism, which locates personality in the person and (...) the situation, contributes measurement to transactionalism but its paradigmatic status is ambiguous because it implies an internal storage system for behavior. (shrink)

Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology. Their approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, Bishop and Trout show how people can improve their reasoning by relying (...) on Statistical Prediction Rules. They then develop and articulate the positive core of the book. Their view, Strategic Reliabilism, claims that epistemic excellence consists in the efficient allocation of cognitive resources to reliable reasoning strategies, applied to significant problems. The last third of the book develops the implications of this view for standard analytic epistemology; for resolving normative disputes in psychology; and for offering practical, concrete advice on how this theory can improve real people's reasoning. This is a truly distinctive and controversial work that spans many disciplines and will speak to an unusually diverse group, including people in epistemology, philosophy of science, decision theory, cognitive and clinical psychology, and ethics and public policy. (shrink)

Scientists and laypeople alike use the sense of understanding that an explanation conveys as a cue to good or correct explanation. Although the occurrence of this sense or feeling of understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for good explanation, it does drive judgments of the plausibility and, ultimately, the acceptability, of an explanation. This paper presents evidence that the sense of understanding is in part the routine consequence of two well-documented biases in cognitive psychology: overconfidence and hindsight. In light of (...) the prevalence of counterfeit understanding in the history of science, I argue that many forms of cognitive achievement do not involve a sense of understanding, and that only the truth or accuracy of an explanation make the sense of understanding a valid cue to genuine understanding. (shrink)

Inferential statistical tests-such as analysis of variance, t-tests, chi-square and Wilcoxin signed ranks-now constitute a principal class of methods for the testing of scientific hypotheses. In this paper I will consider the role of one statistical concept (statistical power) and two statistical principles or assumptions (homogeneity of variance and the independence of random error), in the reliable application of selected statistical methods. I defend a tacit but widely-deployed naturalistic principle of explanation (E): Philosophers should not treat as inexplicable or basic (...) those correlational facts that scientists themselves do not treat as irreducible. In light of (E), I contend that the conformity of epistemically reliable statistical tests to these concepts and assumptions entails at least the following modest or austere realist commitment: (C) The populations under study have a stable theoretical or unobserved structure that metaphysically grounds the observed values; the objects therefore have a fixed value independent of our efforts to measure them. (C) provides the best explanation for the correlation between the joint use of statistical assumptions and statistical tests, on the one hand, and methodological success on the other. (shrink)

There is now a considerable literature on Michel Foucault but this is the first monograph which explicitly addresses his influence and impact upon education. Personal autonomy has been seen as a major aim, if not the aim of liberal education. But if Foucault is correct that personal autonomy and the notion of the autonomous person are myths, then the pursuit of such an aim by educationalists is misguided. The author develops this critique of personal autonomy and liberal education from the (...) writings of Foucault, and also considers Foucault's own educational practices. The author, James Marshall, who lives in New Zealand, has already written several articles for academic journals on Foucault. (shrink)

Defining terms -- The real world -- The news -- Reading as vacation -- Uses of culture -- The postmodern smirk -- The corporate gallery -- Icons and idols -- Man as Romanian -- Dowsing and science -- Origin myths -- Diplomatic memoir -- A syndrome of simile and metaphor -- Three dreams, one trip -- My obituaries -- Salt water -- My coronation -- Representations -- The pornographic dream -- Against art fairs -- Rescuing the subject from the picture (...) -- Branding the arts -- The end of the affair -- A defense of virtuosity -- Mere esthetics. (shrink)